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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF T·HE E·STATE OF FRED W. HARPER,

Case No.
8049

Deceased.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF· F·ACTS
On January 21, 1954, this Court rendered an opinIon and judgment granting appellant a reversal of a
decree of the trial court holding that certain real property vested in respondent as survivor of a joint tenancy. Respondent hereby respectfully applies for a
rehearing upon the grounds hereinafter set forth.
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J:>OIN'I'S.

REI~IED

ON

Thi~ Court erred:

1.

In failing to recognize that in all divorce actions
111 Uti~ Htate, the court's statutory power to dispose of
propPrty is a 1nere incident to the court's authority to
disHolv(• the bonds of matrimony.
In holding that the order setting aside the interloeutory decrees was void.
2.

3. In holding that the death of the plaintiff did
not u1ake a nullity of the interlocutory decree in its
entirety.
4. In holding that death of one of the spouses
during the interlocutory period terminated the personal
relationship and abated the action insofar as the marital relationship was concerned but that such death did
not abate the action insofar as property rights were
determined by the decree; this in the absence of a
property settlement agree1nent, a contract for, or, a
present conveyance of property affected between the
parties to the divorce action.
5. In holding that the interlocutory decree of divorce where property rights were incidentally determined remained effective and became final in the san1e
manner and at the same time as a decree bet,veen living
persons; this in the absence of a property settlement
agreement, a contract for, or, a present conveyance of
property affected between the parties to the divorce
action.
2
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6. In holding that the death of one of the spouses
during the interlocutory period 'vas not sufficient cause
for the lo,ver court to vacate the interlocutory decree
of divorce.
7. In holding that any party other than the plaintiff or the defendant in the divorce action was, or could
be, entitled to notice of a motion to vacate the interlocutory decree.
8. In holding that upon the death of Fred W. Harper, during the interlocutory period, title to property
held by him in joint tenancy with his surviving spouse,
Zilpha Harper, vested in his heirs or devisees.
9. In holding that the heirs or devisees of Fred
W. Harper were entitled to notice of the motion of
Zilpha Harper, the surviving spouse, made to set aside
the interlocutory decree and to- dismiss the divorce
action.
10. In holding that the lower court's order to vacate the interlocutory decree was subject to collateral
attack.
11. In reversing the judgment of the lower court
and ordering the case remanded with directions to dismiss the petition without prejudice and allow the parties
to be heard upon the merits in the divorce action should
they so desire.
In addition to the errors hereinabove set forth, the
Court speaking through Honorable David T. Le,vis,
Judge, enunciated certain propositions of law which we
3
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I'P~fH'<~tfully submit are of grave concern to the mem-

of the bar, the courts of this State and the litigants
tht• .. eiu. We dirP('t the Court's attention to the following
pronouB<'PllH·nts of the op1n1on.

hPT8

(a) It is stated:
• . • • All the property rights granted Fred W.
llarpPr by the divorce decree vested, upon his
<h~ath, in his heirs or devisees, subject to the statutory liutitations of the decree itself and applicable probate procedures.
;\ nd thereafter:
The death of a party before the decree beronles absolute 1nay under so1ne eireumstances be
sufficient cause to vacate the decree in its entirety. Other factors, such as the welfare of minor
ehildren, 1nay in some instances warrant a dif. ferent disposition of property.
Thus, the opinion has the effect of holding that
in an action for divorce, title to real property 1nay vest
or be not vested, dependent upon the circumstances
peculiarly attendant, not only to the parties but to
their heirs or devisees.
(b)

Further, the opinion states:

* * * When the death of one of the parties occurs
after the entry of a divorce decree and before the
decree is final the decree becon1es ineffective to
dissolve the marriage, death having terminated
that personal relationship * * *.
Thus, it is held, or the effect of the holding is, that
the surviving spouse is the widow of the deceased hus4
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band for all purposes except "There there is an interlocutory decree of divorce wherein property has been
a-\varded the husband W'ho happens to die before the
decree becon1es effective to dissolve the marital relationship.
(c)

Also:

The reasoning of the Rasmussen case is applicable to the instant case.
vVe respectfully suggest to the Court that this conclusion is erroneous. In that case, it is to be remembered, the infor1nation upon "\Vhich the trial court apparently acted 'vas ex parte, and was in no way related to
o1· connected with the action for d.ivorce.
(d)

Finally, the opinion holds:

In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Com1nission,
82 Utah 179, 22 P.2d 1046, and In Re Johnson's
Estate, supra, both of 'vhich interpret the statutory provisions herein considered, neither the
1natter of notice nor the disposition of property
\Vas directly considered or discussed. However,
to the extent the decisions in those cases indicate
approval of ex parte orders as the basis for vacating divorce decrees affecting property rights we
expressly overrule the holdings.
We submit that the decisions in both cases are,
based upon the factual situations presented, legally
sound and that neither decision should by reason of the
problem presented here be disturbed. In Salt Lake City
v. Industrial Commission, supra, both of the parties to
the divorce action moved, during their lifetime, to set

5
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a~idP tht~ intPrlocutory decree. So far as we are here
<'ollt'PI'HPd th(~

holding in that case merely reiterates the
rule that an interlocutory decree of divorce rnay be
P rnventt~d frOlll h<~eotning absolute and its finality postponPd l1y tl1P filing of a rnotion to vacate the findings
of fa<·t anu dPeree as was previously decided in Spenl't'r r. ()lark, 54 Utah R3, 179 P. 741. In Re Joh!nsons
/f,'sfall', S-t. l 'tah lfiH, 35 P.2d 305, affirms also the holding- in ~-~'Ju~nl'er 1.:. ()lark, supra, and stands squarely
for the propo:-:ition that the death of a party during the
interl<H'Utory decree is sufficient ground for vacating
the deerPe of the divorce, as no final judgment could
he entered against a deceased person and no one could
be snbstituted for a deceased party in such an action.

(e) l\fay \Ve also suggest to the Court that the
California authorities relied upon by the appellant here
ean and should be distinguished on statutory grounds.
rrhere the laws provide:

• * • that the death of either party after the
entry of the interlocutory judgment does not
impair the power of the court to enter final
judgment. Civil Code of California., 1949, Divorce, Sec. 132.
With all of the above in mind, we present to the
Court the following:

ARGUMENT
An action for divorce is of a purely personal nature,
in which nothing is sought to be affected ~ut the marital
status of the parties as husband and wife. The distri6
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bution of property in such an action is merely incidental,
and it is clearly incontestable that on the death of either
party before the decree, the subject of the controversy
is elinlinated and the action abates, unless a statute provides to the contrary. 1 Am. J ur., Abaten1ent and Revival,
Sec. 110, page 83. Under our statute, 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953,
the power of the court to determine property rights is
dependent upon the granting of a divorce to one of the
parties. Under the particular facts in this case, did the
court below, after the death of Fred vV. Harper, have
such power J? We think it apparent that the court did
not, since that personal relationship no longer existed.
The trial court did have the power to determine and did
in fact determine that at the time of the interlocutory
decree, Fred W. Harper 'vas entitled to a divorce on the
grounds of desertion from Zilpha D. Harper. The interlocutory decree did not dissolve the marriage. Borg v.
Borg, 76 P.2d 218 (Cal. App. 1938); Green v. Green, 151
P.2d 679 (Cal. App. 1944). The death of F'red W. Harper
left Zilpha D. Harper his widow with rights as such with
regard his estate. Hammond v. Hammond, 13 N.Y. Supp·.
2d. 870; Diggs v. D·iggs, 196 NE 858 (Mass. 1935). The
status of the proceedings after the entry of the interlocutory decree remained that of a pending action and
the action abated upon the death of Fred W. Harper
so that the decree could never become final, automatically
or otherwise. 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, Sec.
442, page 366 ; see also, Sec. 179, page 241. The state no
longer had an interest in the proceedings. McElrath v.
McElrath, 139 NW 708 (Minn.). Could now the order of

7
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t liP lowpr· <·ourt which vacated the decree be absolutely

void T BPa~on tPlls us that the order was proper to set
n~ide the d(·<· n~e of divorce since the marriage relation~ hip wa~ not tPl'tninated in that manner. But, says this
Court, <·it.ing 1lasu~ussen v. Call, 55 Utah 597, 188 P. 275,
tlu· <·onrt had no statutory power to set aside the decree,
und<· r SP<·. :30-:~-7, l ~.C.A. 1953, without giving all persons
who~t- rights ar(' involved notice and an opportunity to
hP heard. ln that <·a~e neither party to the action for
divon:P was der<~as<~d and they were the only parties
proper to thf' action to divorce. Such is not here the
ea~P: v;e are concerned \vith a situation wherein appellant sought a decree of divorce from this respondent but
the cau~e failed because death intervened. When the
<·.ourt '"as without po\ver to grant a divorce, it was po,vPrless also to enter any other order in that cause, except
to Yaca te the action, since the right of the court to deterlninP property rights \\·as statutorily dependent upon the
right to decee a divorce. The interlocutory decree, it
n1ust be re1nembered, in this case dealt only with the
rights of the parties to the action and by no stretch of
the imagination could any third party have intervened
in that action. It was a personal action- for divorce only
and the distribution of property therein attempted was
1nerely incidental to the purpose of the action.

The rule this Court_has now adopted is certainly not
the rule at common law.
In St(Jfnhope v. Sanhope (1886) L.R. 11 Prob.
_
Div. (Eng.) 103-C.A., it was held that, where
plaintiff in a divorce suit had obtained a decree

8
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nisi and died before the expiration of the tin1e
after 'v hich such decree could be rnade final, hi~
personal representative could not revive the suit
for the purpose of having the decree 1nade absolute. As against the contention that the suit
should be allowed to be revived, and that the
decree nisi should be per1nitted to be made absolute, because 1naking it absolute would affect
property rights, the c~urt said: "It may do so
in many cases, as, for instance, by enabling children to get a settlement altered. The object of
the suit, ho,vever, is not to alter rights of property, though it may have that effect, as by depriving a won1an of a legacy given to her by the
description of the husband's widow. Such a
result, however, is only incidental; it is not the
object of the suit, but results incidentally from
the putting an end to the marriage."
:Nor is it the rule adopted by the N e'v York court.
* * * the court In Re Crandall (1909) 196 N.Y.
127, 89 N.E. 578, 134 Am. St. Rep. 830, 17 Ann.
Cas. 874, conceding that in some jurisdictions a
party defeated by a judgment in a divorce action,
and thereby deprived of property rights, may
prosecute an ap·peal after the death of the other
party, observed that it had never been held that
an interlocutory judgment entered- in a divorce
action rnay be made final after the death of the
plaintiff, because incidentally it might take away
property rights frorn the other party, and that
the contrary has been held.
104 A.L.R. 661.

Or of the State of Washington:
It is the general rule, concurred in by respondent, that an action for divorce proper,
being purely a personal action based upon the
personal relationship and status of marriage,
9
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tertuinates with the death of either spouse, not
only because of its personal character, but be<·a U~<~. the 1narriage is ipso facto dissolved by
death. But, contends respondent where as in the
.tnstant caHP, the interlocutory decree
'
'
settled
the
propPrty rights of the parties, the action does
not abate, in so far as the property rights are
<;on('<~rned, but such decree 1nay be reviewed by
thi~ court, to the <~xtent that it involves such
rights. '(1here is rnuch authority from other jurisdiction~-\ to suHtain this contention of respondent, but \\'e are of the opinion that, under our
decision:-:, the interlocutory decree, in its entirety
.
'
abah~s and beeomes a nullity, upon the death of
one of the parties, \\Thether before or after the
interlocutory decree is entered. We stated in
J),vyer v. Dolan, 40 \Vash. 459, 82 P. 746, 747, 1
L.l~ ..A.. , N.S., 551, 111 Am. St. Rep. 919, 5 Ann.
Cas. 890: "It "~in not he gainsaid that an action
for divorce is a purely personal action. Nothing
is sought to be affected by the marital status of
the husband and "Tife. The distribution of property in such an action is incidental, and it is
clearly incontestable that upon the death of
either party, whether before or after the decree,
the subject of the co1~troversy is elimi1'1Jated. 93
P. 2d 429, IJf cPherson v. IJ{ cPherson, (Wash.
1939.)
The facts in the instant case, reduced to the bare
essentials are that the Harpers were married and acquired real property 'vhich the title thereto they held in
joint tenancy. Thereafter, unhappy circumstances and
differences arising between them, the wife departed their
their home and went to California where she chose to
remain. The husband, after the expiration of a year,
10
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brought 8nit for divorre and the 'vife entered hPr \raiver
to the proceedings thereon. The interlocutory decree
entered but the husband died before a final decree, by
operation of statute, becrune effective. The wife, learning of the death of her husband, then, without notice to
the husband's heirs or adn1inistrators, petitioned the
court to set aside the interlocutory decree. The court,
having lost jurisdiction over one of the parties by reason
of the Lord having assumed it, was then confronted 'vith
a lawsuit having a defendant but no longer a plaintiff
in an action purely personal to the parties and there being
no statutory right of succession and no possibility for
a substitution of parties; this certainly insofar as the
primary object of the suit was concerned, i.e., the matter
of divorce. Incidental only to the purpose of the suit
was the statutory authority of the court, if he could decree a final divorce, to make disposition of pToperty.
We ask, whom could he have ordered service be h·ad
upon~

Will the court give further consideration to the wife's
consent and waiver in this case~ The wife consented to the
husband's right to the divorce, and she chose to let him
thus acquire title to the property rather than return and
contest the action. From this, can we go further and
conclude that it was her intention, should her husband
die during the marriage relationship, to waive her right
of survivorship in the property. We heartily contend
that this Court can indulge in no such presumption.
What would have been the result had no suit for divorce
be filed~ By orderly legal process, exactly a.s the wife
11
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availPd herHelf of in this case (Sec. 78-41-1, U.C.A. 1953)
:-\he would have established her right to title and owner:-\hip or thP property. It is admitted that Zilpha was
Fred's widow; can we now distinguish her legal rights
in this situation by Haying that based upon an ex parte
intPrlo<'utory de<'ree of divorce she was the guilty party
in a Juarriage still existing because she chose to leave
l1t-r huHband's lHld and board. To draw such a fine distinction is to rnake possible the error of greater wrongs
and to 1naterially weaken the status of. the marriage
relationship.
'Ve do not here contend that the rule adopted by
this Court in this decision would be void of legal reason
had the situation involved a contract, property settlement agree1nent, or conveyance. In such case third parties and strangers to the divorce action would have their
legal ren1edy as against the surviving spouse without the
infringe1nent upon the divorce action in which they could
have no personal status.
It is our further contention that the rule adopted
1nakes serious inroads into the n1arketability of the title
to real property and can only further confuse the fee
to the expense, and harrassn1ent of owners andjor purchasers within this jurisdiction.
In remanding this case the Court said, in part:

* * * and allow the parties to be heard upon the
1nerits in the divorce action * * *.
We ask for clarification. Death terminated the marriage relation, and no power can dissolve a marriage

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which lias already been dissolved hy act of God. Bell
r. Bell~ 1~1 lT.S. 173~ 21 S. Ct. 351, -l-5 L. Ed. 804. \Vho
'Yould appear for the deceased 'f
We respectfully sub1nit that a rehearing should be
granted for the correction of the Inanifest errors in
the Court's decision.

FRED L. FINLINSON
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorneys for Respondent.
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